In response to the proposal that cognitive phenomena might be best understood in terms of cognitive theories (Endress, 2013), Frank (2013 outlined an important research program, suggesting that Bayesian models should be used as rigorous, mathematically attractive implementations of psychological theories. This research program is important and promising. However, I show that it is not followed in practice. I then turn to Frank's defense of the assumption that learners prefer more specific rules (the ''size principle''), and show that the results allegedly supporting this assumption do not provide any support for it. Further, I demonstrate that, in contrast to Frank's criticisms, there is no circularity in an account of rule-learning based on ''common-sense psychology'', and that Frank's other criticisms of this account are unsupported. I conclude that the research program outlined by Frank is important and promising, but needs to be followed in practice. Be that as it might, the rule-learning experiments discussed by Frank are still better explained by simple psychological mechanisms.
Introduction
Using Frank and Tenenbaum's (2011) (hereafter FT) Bayesian model of rule learning as a case study, I (Endress, 2013) proposed that such models cannot be considered ideal-observer models but rather make important ad hoc assumptions that determine the model behavior. Further, I argued that a model based on simple psychological mechanisms explains the data better. Frank (2013) outlined a general strategy for how Bayesian models could make important contributions for studying cognition. While promising and important, I show that Frank's research program is generally not followed in practice, and that Frank's criticisms of my other points and of the simple psychological model of rule learning are unsupported by earlier research and, therefore, unfounded (see Appendix A for specific replies to Frank's claims; a critical discussion of the evidence Frank cites in support of the size principle can be found in Endress (in review)).
How to use Bayesian models for studying cognition
Frank proposes that Bayesian models are well suited for formalizing theories of cognition, by implementing hypotheses in a framework with attractive mathematical properties, as ''Bayesian inference is 'optimal' in the sense that it leads to the correct posterior distribution.'' In other words, using a Bayesian methodology guarantees that, given a set of assumptions, the predictions of Bayesian models are indeed those that follow from the assumptions. This is a useful property, even though non-Bayesian models make the predictions that follow from their assumptions as well. Crucially, however, while this approach is promising and important, I will show below that it is rarely followed in practice, for two important reasons.
First, if Bayesian models were really used as suggested by Frank, they would be silent on issues about whether human information processing is optimal. While Frank argues that Bayesian models are not used to make such claims of optimality, he also acknowledges that many modelers do make such claims. In fact, even FT assert that their models reflect the ''computational structure of the task'' (Footnote 1); if so, learners who behave according
